Rivers of Power: The Polar Silk Road and Russia’s Arctic Arteries

Author: Caloianu Anamaria Florina

The Arctic is undergoing a profound transformation: climate-driven ice melt is unlocking new maritime passages and triggering major geopolitical shifts(Williams, 2024).For Russia, however, the Arctic is not just an ocean frontier but also the end point of its major north-flowing rivers, which carry resources from Siberia’s interior toward the polar seas (The Arctic Institute, 2022). This resource-focused geography helps explain why Moscow considers the region more than a peripheral area: it is an economic lifeline. Consequently, China’s Polar Silk Road (PSR), launched in 2017 as an Arctic extension of the Belt and Road Initiative, aligns with Russia’s strategic goals by reimagining the Northern Sea Route as a modern ‘Golden Waterway,’ offering trade corridors and resource opportunities that could connect Siberia’s hinterland with the rest of the world markets.

For a brief moment, between 2018 and 2021, this plan seemed to gather genuine momentum, with record Chinese voyages hinting that the dream was solidifying into reality (Lim, 2018), yet the outbreak of Russia’s war in Ukraine in 2022 froze this development in its tracks: sanctions, soaring costs, and political risk turned the PSR from a rising tide into still waters.

While some analyses portray the Polar Silk Road (PSR) as mostly symbolic and uncertain, hindered by the war in Ukraine, experts Erdem Lamazhapov, Iselin Stensdal, and Gørild Heggelund argue that China’s Arctic engagement shows a deeper strategic persistence: they demonstrate that, despite COSCO suspending voyages and BRI engagement in Russia falling to zero in 2022, China has kept significant stakes in the projects Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG-2, diversified its energy sources through Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and continued long-term investments in polar shipping and mining technology (Lamazhapov, Stensdal and Heggelund, 2022).

  In contrast to the story of decline, the analysis provided by the authors emphasizes how the PSR functions more as a "long game" of gradual progress than as an abandoned project adaptation, striking a balance between short-term caution and long-term technological and energy ambitions (Lamazhapov, Stensdal, and Heggelund, 2022).

Few states have direct access to the region, while others are actively seeking involvement.Experts Ryan Burke and Adrienne Hopper argue that Arctic security increasingly depends on “international goodwill and consensus solutions” (Burke and Hopper, 2022), as a result, the resulting disparity in access to Arctic trade routes, security locations, and resources creates a structural imbalance among states, especially those aiming to rise or maintain their position in the international arena. Consequently, the analysis of the Arctic through the lens of offensive realism examines how geographical factors and strategic opportunities influence state conduct, primarily in areas such as infrastructure development, scientific research, and resource acquisition as means of exerting influence.

The principal Russian rivers, namely the Ob, Yenisei, Lena, and Northern Dvina, are not just geographical landmarks; they form the vital arteries of Moscow’s future Arctic agenda. Historically, these rivers functioned as conduits of conquest and colonization, integrating Siberia into the Russian imperial space (Lechtenberg, n.d.). Rivers hold a special importance in geopolitics (Smith, 2020, pp. 11–15). They serve as natural borders, basins of vital resources, instruments of cooperation and conflict, as well as transport and trade routes, and are also symbolic and cultural elements. The Amur River, described by Thubron (2008, p. 8) as “a fault line shrouded in old mistrust,” is a key factor in the accelerated Sino-Russian dynamics of recent years, as well as a main route in Beijing’s plan to access the Arctic, part of the Polar Silk Road initiative.

At the start, with the outbreak of the war between Ukraine and Russia, Moscow’s relations with Beijing grew stronger due to Russia’s isolation and the sanctions imposed by European Union member states and others. Russia saw China as a complex partner, one that constantly shifts the balance in their asymmetrical economic relationship and raises urgent questions about influence in Central Asia. However, Russia finds itself in a delicate position, making economic cooperation with China all the more vital. The main obstacle to increasing exchanges between these neighboring countries is Russia’s underdeveloped and inadequate infrastructure along the border with China (Antonov, 2024), the massive volume of goods transported strains its railway system, and the alternative of using drones(Japan Times, 2025) is only a temporary “band-aid” solution rather than a sustainable long-term option (Smith, 2020, pp. 11–15).

The Polar Silk Road exemplifies how diverse narratives shape Arctic engagement: Beijing portrays it as a collaborative ‘blue economic passage’ under the Belt and Road Initiative, aimed at securing resources, developing new shipping routes, and expanding influence in governance. In contrast, Moscow views it as an extension of its sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route, emphasizing control and economic growth. This distinction is important because it demonstrates how each country justifies its existence, influences investment decisions, and manages negotiations for collaboration. Initiatives like Yamal LNG demonstrate how these perspectives converge: China gains energy security and quick access to Europe, Russia benefits from investments, making the PSR a site for collaboration and geopolitical contest.

The resulting divergence underscores a fundamental asymmetry: China pursues openness to lower vulnerability, while Russia advocates for closure to maintain its dominance. Where Beijing views the Arctic as a global shared space, Moscow regards it as a zone of hierarchical control, managed through inland waterways and militarized ports.

From the perspective of Offensive Realism, these rivers are not just passive channels for commerce but act as strategic tools linked to Russia’s goal of Arctic dominance, their connection with the Northern Sea Route (NSR) gives Moscow a clear advantage: inland waterways enable the direct movement of resources to Arctic ports like Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Dudinka, and Sabetta, where they are then used for both commercial and strategic purposes.

Each port acts as a control gateway, where the arteries of the Siberian hinterland connect with the maritime veins of the Arctic Ocean; by militarizing these logistical hubs with naval facilities, icebreaker bases, and integrated defense systems, Russia turns infrastructure into a tool of coercion. The state, acting as both engineer and heart, pumps resources outward to extract global rents while inwardly drawing sovereignty to secure its Arctic frontier; in this way, Russia’s rivers exemplify the logic of preemptive dominance typical of offensive realism, as Moscow consolidates control over inland waterways and coastal choke points not in response to threats but to ensure it remains the essential gatekeeper of polar connectivity.

As the Arctic thaws, Siberia’s rivers awaken from their seasonal slumber, flowing more reliably toward the Northern Sea Route and carrying the lifeblood of resources to the polar coast; This newfound consistency transforms Moscow into the heartbeat of East–West Arctic trade, a crucial route through which the advantages of faster trans-Arctic passage must flow, while other nations, lacking such vital arteries, risk watching these exchanges slip out of reach.

Yet the very forces that produce opportunity also reveal vulnerability. Thawing permafrost weakens the stability of ports, pipelines, and transportation routes; changing ice conditions make long-term planning more difficult. Although some nations might view these vulnerabilities as reasons to delay expansion, Russia has responded by boosting its defenses. It has upgraded river mouths with dual-purpose hubs in Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Dudinka, and Sabetta, expanded its nuclear icebreaker fleet, and integrated coastal defenses into its logistical network. Infrastructure is being developed not only to support commercial traffic but also to defend against disruptions and to assert control over any actor attempting to gain access.

Riverine geography, maritime infrastructure, and climate change together create a complex, interconnected system. Melting ice is more than an environmental issue; it acts as a catalyst for shifting power relations, therefore, instead of a shared economic route, what develops is a system where Moscow seeks to control access, ensuring the crucial flow from Siberia exits solely through its gateways.

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