Baltic Borders: Between the European Union and Russia, 2022–2025
Author: Caloianu Anamaria Florina
Due to their shared communist heritage and the enduring influence of Russia, the Baltic states have consistently maintained a vigilant stance toward both the European Union and Russia in their external relations. The concern that Russian imperial ambitions may reemerge at any time has become profoundly ingrained in their foreign policy, resulting in a more cautious approach in interactions with Western nations while heavily relying on NATO’s security assurances.
The sizable Russian minorities added complexity to the situation, after the Soviet Union's fall, a natural division emerged, with these minorities being viewed with greater suspicion than others. This suspicion was reinforced by government policies aimed at protecting national identity and unity through language and citizenship laws. For example, Estonia’s 1999 Language Law barred descendants of foreigners from holding public office, reserving these roles for ethnic Estonians. Although the law aimed to strengthen national identity, it also deepened the divide between Estonians and the Russian-speaking community.
The European Union expressed support for the potential expansion and commented on the Baltic states, Estonia stood out as the most compliant candidate, with an economy and development outlook that clearly exceeded those of its neighbors. Latvia, while acknowledged as having a functioning market economy, faced significant challenges in its judicial system that hampered its economic development. Lithuania demonstrated closer integration among its state institutions, though many still bore the remnants of Soviet-era alienation.
Russia viewed the Baltic States' accession to both the EU and NATO simultaneously as a direct threat to its security and sovereignty. To offer a deeper understanding of the region and connect it to the wider Eastern Neighborhood discussion, this paper compares the Baltic States' dual roles: as EU members and as perceived challengers to Russian influence. This framework enables us to examine their involvement in regional policies and conflicts, particularly in the context of the ongoing situation in Ukraine. The research primarily relies on books, official EU documents, and statements from Russian and Baltic officials. Additionally, media reports, articles, and social media content, such as videos and tweets, are used to capture current narratives and perceptions.
Russia never explicitly set out to reunify with the Baltic States, formally excluding them from its official goals; however, these countries served as strategic leverage points against Western institutions, functioning like chess pieces. The geography intensified this dynamic: Lithuania, for instance, was caught between Russia and Belarus, acting like a hinge, while the Baltic region overall was a fragile strip relying on NATO’s protection. Russia’s lack of transparency about its true motives fostered an atmosphere of uncertainty, with actions in Ukraine or the Caspian Sea affecting the region and reminding the Baltics how quickly their security could shift. Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė stressed that the threat of a Russian invasion remains real, even if the immediate risk seems low.
The author Mark Galeotti raises the question of whether Russia is pursuing expansion or political influence, adding a third point: that Russia seeks “leverage outside the region rather than within and considers the Baltic states a theater in every sense, in which offensive intent can be signaled and offensive capabilities demonstrated without leading to open conflict” (Galeotti, 2022). Russia operates under a constant sense of siege, convinced that NATO and the EU are encircling it to keep it contained, if not subdued. Within this atmosphere of prolonged paranoia, Moscow has taken a defensive stance toward the Baltic States, not so much because of their size but because of what they represent in the broader Western framework. Attacking them directly would be equivalent to declaring war on both NATO and the EU, so instead, Russia depends on the threat of its nuclear arsenal as leverage.
The shadow of Russian power in the Baltic is most visible in Kaliningrad, a heavily militarized enclave that acts as both a fortress and a strategic tool of coercion, the permanent stationing of nuclear weapons there signals a deliberate posture of intimidation toward neighboring states, reinforcing a climate of persistent tension. In an invasion, NATO reinforcements would need to pass through the narrow Suwałki Corridor, situated between Kaliningrad, a heavily fortified Russian exclave, and Belarus, a Russian ally. This narrow strip of land, scarcely a mark on the map, is frequently referred to as NATO’s Achilles’ heel, a slender passage that could be blocked at any moment, possibly isolating the Baltic States and making them resemble islands at the edge of Europe.
The Baltic states face a particularly vulnerable position in Europe’s security landscape, where Russian aggression and regional instability have direct, immediate effects. Latvian Parliament chair Rihards Kols noted that Ukraine’s fight is tied to their own security, making the region highly susceptible to spillover. Hesitation or delays increase the risk. This vulnerability goes beyond military threats: Estonia’s call for a stronger American diplomatic presence shows how political gaps can worsen insecurity. Additionally, over 24,000 Ukrainian refugees have entered a population of just 1.3 million, highlighting humanitarian and logistical challenges. Before the June 2022 NATO Summit, Baltic leaders stressed that their security is precarious due to geopolitical exposure, limited resources, and proximity to potential threats. This demonstrates that even small European states can face outsized risks amid instability. Despite ongoing threats and uncertainties about Europe’s future, the Baltic countries trust NATO’s deterrent capacity, considering a large-scale invasion unlikely while remaining vigilant against cyberattacks, propaganda, and disinformation.
Since 2022, the Baltic and Nordic states have accelerated an urgent process of strategic recalibration, driven by heightened awareness of Russian aggression and the unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy. Defense capabilities have been significantly expanded, including the modernization of military infrastructure, acquisition of advanced weaponry, and reinforcement of rapid-response units. Regional coordination with NATO and European partners has intensified, with joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and permanent rotational deployments enhancing collective readiness. Beyond troop presence, security now emphasizes robust diplomatic engagement, political representation, and strategic communication.
For instance, attention to gaps such as the prolonged absence of a U.S. ambassador in Estonia and the vulnerabilities of Greenland’s critical communications infrastructure highlights the need for a multidimensional approach that combines military strength, political presence, and technological resilience to deter threats and reassure populations.In parallel, these states are actively preparing for a spectrum of potential scenarios. Continued NATO and European support may reinforce the status quo, while any reduction in U.S. engagement could necessitate more autonomous regional mobilization. In response, countries across the Baltic and Nordic regions are not only bolstering their defense capabilities but also strengthening infrastructure, expanding logistical networks, and coordinating contingency plans for rapid deployment.
Humanitarian challenges, particularly the reception of tens of thousands of Ukrainian refugees relative to small national populations, further underscore the interconnected nature of military, political, and social security concerns. These pressures reinforce the imperative for internal cohesion, cross-border collaboration, and a comprehensive approach to resilience.
The events of recent years have catalyzed a profound shift in mindset: the Baltic and Nordic states have moved from peripheral observers to proactive agents shaping regional security. By integrating defense modernization, diplomatic engagement, and strategic collaborations with NATO and European allies, they are building a more adaptive and self-reliant posture.
Investments in military technology, joint training exercises, and shared command structures have enhanced interoperability, while regional cooperation ensures that the states can respond collectively to crises. These measures collectively reflect an understanding that contemporary security challenges are multidimensional, requiring a balance between deterring Russian aggression, maintaining credibility, and managing humanitarian, economic, and technological factors. In doing so, the Baltic and Nordic states are forging a resilient framework capable of navigating an increasingly multipolar and unpredictable European security landscape.
Russian minorities in eastern regions and capitals pose minimal internal risk; the broader population’s pro-European and pro-NATO stance acts as a stabilizer, and even Moscow sympathizers recognize the economic disadvantages of reintegration with Russia. These issues have strengthened unity among the Baltic states and their solidarity with Ukraine, showing that security guarantees alone are insufficient in a world where revisionist powers can act aggressively without broad international support. The conflict has motivated the Baltics to enhance internal cohesion and actively collaborate with NATO and the EU, reaffirming that their security, prosperity, and regional stability depend not only on external protection but also on internal resilience and coordinated efforts with Western allies.
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