The Pahlavi Dynasty and Americanism in Iran: A Historical Perspective
Author: Caloianu Anamaria Florina
Americanism is a concept that defies a strict or rigid definition; for clarity, dictionaries offer a useful reference point, defining it as an attachment to the ideals, institutions, and values of the United States (Webster Dictionary, n.d.). To complement this, and to capture the projection of Americanism in the international sphere, we may also consider the sentiment expressed in a 1916 article that reflects the outlook of Americans at the beginning of the 20th century: “When we count up our assets, we must reckon heavily on the respect of those nations which we most respect, and whose good-will in the past is a guarantee of good-will in the future. It is worth our while, even from the standpoint of Americanism, to prove our fellowship with humanity, our care for other interests than our own. The civilization of the world is the business of all who live in the world.” (Repplier, 1916). While a definition of Americanism provides a starting point, it is often easier to observe anti-Americanism in practice, as it evolves in richer, more fragmented forms and is shaped by the personalized perspectives of those who reject the very content of that definition.
The United States, through its institutions, legislation, culture, values, media, patterns of consumption, economy, entrepreneurial spirit, and active role in foreign affairs, emerged as both a model of state-building and a societal blueprint in the 20th century. This privileged position in the international arena enabled it to project overwhelming influence: fostering partnerships with those willing to align, while generating anxieties and risks of enmity among those who resisted. This pinnacle status, as the preeminent power of the international order, was consolidated by its ‘victory’ at the end of the Cold War and by a carefully coordinated meta-narrative centered on the export of liberal, Western values and the promotion of human rights.
During the Cold War, a distinction was often made between American citizens and the United States as a country, while ordinary Americans could be more easily separated from political narratives. 'America,' its leaders, and policies evoked strong reactions from both allies and adversaries. Citizens of other countries often distinguished between 'Americans,' seen as individuals shaped by U.S. cultural norms, values, and lifestyles, and 'America,' perceived as the embodiment of government interests, closely tied to the declarations and authority of the sitting President in foreign policy matters. This difference is significant for my paper, as it shows that modern narratives of anti-Americanism do not necessarily target the American people themselves. Instead, they often reflect rejection and hostility toward the actions, declarations, and policies of U.S. officials.
For this study, I have chosen Iran under the Pahlavi regime, my reasons are fourfold: first, this period represents a stage in American - Iranian relations that I have not previously analyzed; second, the Pahlavi era reflects major transitions in Iran’s modernization efforts, its opening to the international sphere, and its domestic transformations in state- and norm-building; third, the timeframe offers a revealing case within the tumultuous context of the Cold War’s bipolar order; and finally, examining the failure of Americanism-infused policies and attitudes during this period allows for a deeper understanding of how anti-American sentiments emerged, moving beyond the oversimplified view that attributes rejection of the West, and specifically the American model, solely to religious or cultural factors.
The main questions proposed by this study are the following:
1. How do we define Americanism in relation to Iran during the years 1921-1979 as this was the time span of the Pahlavi Dynasty? Why was there an inclination towards such adherence?
2. When does modernization turn into the framework of Americanism, and through which instruments could that be achieved?
3. What were the failures of the Pahlavi regime and Reza Shah’s adherence to the Western, particularly American, model that contributed to the rise of anti-Americanism in Iran?
To understand the relationship between the Pahlavi dynasty and Americanism, it helps to start with how Iranians initially perceived the United States: early impressions were shaped both by the presence and activities of American missionaries in Persia and by observations of America’s rapid economic growth and expanding global influence, this exposure made the entrepreneurial spirit of the United States particularly notable, and it was widely admired as a model that could be emulated within Iran’s own modernization efforts (Offiler, 2015, p. 16).
Under Reza Khan and later Mohammad Reza Shah, the country navigated the turbulence of World War II and the Cold War, a period marked by intensified foreign influence in the Middle East. Disillusioned by the imperial rivalries of Britain and Russia, the country’s elites increasingly viewed the United States as a more suitable partner: a seemingly non-interventionist power capable of providing both economic and security benefits.For Washington, Iran’s significance was both strategic and economic, as a Gulf pivot safeguarding American interests and as a vital oil supplier; yet this partnership exposed the paradox of Americanism: successive U.S. administrations supported autocratic rulers, most notably Mohammad Reza Shah, whose censorship, repression, and systemic corruption starkly contradicted the democratic and liberal values America claimed to champion.
The resulting contradiction underscores the fundamental hypocrisy at the heart of U.S. foreign policy in Iran: while the United States promoted democratic and liberal values abroad, it simultaneously endorsed the Shah’s autocratic rule, prioritizing strategic and economic interests over genuine political reform. This alignment with a regime that concentrated power, suppressed opposition, and implemented top-down modernization projects allowed Washington to maintain a reliable ally in the Gulf, but it came at the cost of ignoring the social and cultural tensions that these policies generated. The U.S.’s superficial assessment of the Shah’s reforms, by focusing on the veneer of modernization without accounting for their disruptive impact on traditional structures, economic inequalities, and societal norms, meant that American policymakers underestimated the depth of popular discontent.
Consequently, when widespread opposition emerged, fueled by grievances over censorship, repression, and cultural alienation, the American administration found itself unprepared for the intensity of anti-American sentiment that erupted during the 1979 Revolution and crystallized in the Hostage Crisis. In this sense, U.S. foreign policy both enabled the Shah’s consolidation of power and inadvertently sowed the seeds of its own diplomatic crisis, revealing a profound tension between ideological ideals and strategic imperatives
The Revolution marks the decisive rupture in U.S. - Iranian relations: public perception often reduces this hostility to religious fanaticism, suggesting that Iranians rejected America solely based on Islam; such an interpretation is misleading: a more accurate analogy is that of a boiling pot: those approaching it for the first time notice only the vapors, not the ingredients beneath. While the establishment of the Islamic Republic under Sharia law became the most visible outcome, the protests and the overwhelming referendum of March 30–31, 1979, approved by 98.2% of voters (Iranian Ministry of Interior, n.d.), were driven by a much broader set of grievances.
Iran’s political story in the 20th century began with the Constitutional Revolution, which created a parliament but left much of the old power structure intact (Constitutional Revolution. Despite popular demands, monarchs retained near-absolute authority, curbing opposition and undermining parliamentary influence. In this sense, one of the central myths of Americanism, the adoption of democratic institutions, remained hollow in Iran, providing a façade that enabled autocratic abuse. The Pahlavi regime’s excesses were tied to the need to legitimize its rule, and in exchange for consolidating monarchical power, they sought to present modernization as the path to national rejuvenation, modeled on American ideals. This ambition was driven by two intertwined impulses: Iran’s self-perception, rooted in its Persian heritage, as a great civilization worthy of recognition, and the trauma of humiliation under European imperial domination.
Modernization was clearly necessary given Iran’s struggling economy, rural social structure, and widespread religious influence over education, law, and everyday life. The Shah’s secularizing efforts led to visible advancements, especially in industrial growth, political centralization, and Western lifestyle trends. However, the process was rushed and lacked sensitivity to Iran’s complex sociopolitical fabric, the deep-rooted role of Islam in both private and public spheres, and the fragile balance of authority within families and communities. As a result, modernization didn’t serve as a source of legitimacy but instead became a cause for resentment, fueling the very anti-American sentiment that eventually sparked revolution.
The entrenched influence of the clergy and nobility planted the first seeds of anti-Americanism, as the Pahlavi dynasty forcefully dismantled long-standing social structures and sought to reshape state-society relations, along with the very image and habits of the Iranian people, to imitate the West. Yet in dislocating the traditional sources of authority as advisors, judges, and mentors, the regime created a vacuum it could not fill.
Predictably, the resentment of these two powerful groups was soon joined by broader discontent. The regime’s heavy-handed modernization, imposed through censorship and despotic rule, alienated intellectuals, conservatives, the unemployed, and victims of repression, all of whom demanded the recovery of something lost in translation between Iranian identity and the Western model of state-building. In this context, anti-Americanism became both a political and cultural rallying cry.
A key question emerges: where does modernization end, and where does Americanization begin?
Iran’s need for development in work, education, telecommunications, transport, agriculture, and foreign relations was undeniable. But could these reforms be pursued in close partnership with the U.S. without undermining domestic harmony? Under Mohammad Reza Shah, modernization increasingly merged with Westernization, and ultimately with Americanization, his efforts to draw closer to Washington during the Cold War (Offiler, 2015, p. 23) placed Iran firmly in the American camp, and in return, the U.S. provided arms, intelligence, and influence, enabling Iran’s bid to assert itself as a Gulf power and aspiring regional hegemon.
Yet this partnership embodied a duality: while hard power exchanges were largely confined to elite circles, American soft power permeated everyday life. Asadzade (2019, p. 1) notes that populations in U.S.-aligned states were saturated with American culture and consumer trends. In Iran, this fueled a backlash: the 1979 Revolution must thus be understood partly as a rejection of American cultural imperialism, with critics denouncing its consumerism as vulgar, superficial, and corrosive of Persian traditions. As Patrick Clawson observes in The Paradox of Anti-Americanism in Iran, Iranian nativism was not merely religious conservatism, but also a secular intellectual movement seeking to protect Iran’s poetry, music, art, and cultural heritage (Clawson, 2004, p. 22).
To retain U.S. interest, Iran was pressured to appear more homogenous, secular, and Westernized. The Shah’s own perception of the West was decisive: regarding the U.S. as a model, he accelerated social transformation in ways that clashed with America’s professed ideals of democracy and human rights. As Guerrero (2016, p. 14) notes, the Shah repeatedly violated the 1906 Constitution, centralizing authority in his own hands. He justified this by arguing that democracy required prior stages of modernization, and that premature liberalization would breed instability, although in practice, democracy was indefinitely deferred, leaving Iran modernized in form yet fractured in substance.
To analyze the transformations of the Pahlavi era, they can be divided into hard power policies and cultural choices, the latter reflecting efforts to bridge U.S. - Iranian differences. On the hard power side, the Shah did not fully comply with American demands: his insistence on vast arms purchases was encouraged especially under Nixon, and his pursuit of a nuclear program with Eisenhower’s support revealed his limited interest in social reform (Ganji, 2006, p. 12). While this troubled U.S. officials and fueled domestic criticism of the alliance, it was largely overlooked in Washington, given Iran’s strategic role as a regional bulwark in the Gulf. As Ganji highlights, Brzezinski, echoing Kissinger, considered Iran the key state for containing Soviet influence in the Middle East (2006, p. 7).
Culturally, Americanism filtered into Iran from the top down. The monarchy and privileged elites, who controlled decision-making, imports, and business deals, benefited most from exposure to U.S. technologies, companies, and cultural products. This created a sharp divide: a minority adapted easily, gaining wealth and status, while the majority faced disruptive changes. Traditional practices of community life, culture, and local self-management were restricted or dismantled under state control, producing generational rifts and conflicting values. In effect, Westernization was experienced as privilege for some and dispossession for many.
The limits of the Shah’s modernization vision were epitomized by the White Revolution, particularly land reform. Conceived to create a more egalitarian society, avert a Marxist uprising, and secure peasant loyalty to the monarchy, the policy backfired. As Guerrero (2016, p. 15) explains, land reform disrupted the countryside, angered landlords, reduced clerical revenues, and left peasants unable to make their new plots productive. Lacking resources, infrastructure, and access to credit, many failed to profit, leading to a steep decline in agricultural output. Instead of stabilizing society, the reforms deepened economic hardship and widened opposition to the regime.
The Shah’s drive to cultivate an educated youth and to urbanize and industrialize Iran, objectives widely championed in the West, was implemented with little regard for existing socio-economic conditions. Land reform and the lack of modern infrastructure triggered massive migration to urban centers, which were ill-equipped to accommodate both an educated and an uneducated workforce seeking improved living standards.
Alongside these structural changes, Western cultural trends such as fashion, music, media, newspapers, and books were introduced,while the regime sought to reduce clerical influence in family life through civil and penal codes enacted in 1938, replacing religious judges with secular ones. Although these reforms theoretically granted women greater legal autonomy in matters such as divorce and marriage age, entrenched familial structures continued to constrain their independence, keeping property, custody, and inheritance tied to fathers or husbands (Moghissi, 1994, p.38). Paternal authority remained a dominant force, limiting women’s choices largely to clothing, even the aggressive anti-veiling campaign under Reza Shah reflected this top-down imposition: “Reza Shah’s main concern was to produce a Westernized and modern image for Iran. As veiled women desfigured that image, they had to be removed from the streets” (Moghissi, 1994, p.39).
Fashion became a visible marker of social division, western clothing, particularly American styles of the 1960s–70s: mini-skirts, short dresses, high-heeled boots, provoked criticism from conservatives and rural migrants. Urban centers became a cultural melting pot, producing stark contrasts in women’s dress codes, as illustrated by Jaqueline Saper: “In our upper middle class northern Tehran neighborhood, women dressed in the latest Western fashions… But our maids and women on the southside of the city and in smaller towns and villages… still chose to wear chador in public… a reminder of the contradictions in Iranian culture” (Saper, 2019, p.19).
The lack of coherence between reforms and Iran’s pre-existing socio-cultural and economic conditions is further highlighted: “The introduction of Western forms of music or sports, the establishment of a public health service, a modern transport system, or even of official censorship… none of these efforts followed a coherent long-term plan” (Devos, 2013, p.5).
Cinema became the dominant leisure activity, but exposure to American films, featuring nudity, premarital sex, and consumerism, generated cultural backlash, clashing with Iranian norms of modesty and Islamic tradition (Saper, 2019, p.20).Meanwhile, censorship of Iranian artists, musicians, painters, and filmmakers stifled authentic cultural expression, while Western media flooded the market. Intellectuals and creators were marginalized, fueling resentment toward the regime and prompting a demand for the recognition and preservation of Iran’s artistic and cultural heritage.
Suddenly, it was an attack on the importance of their heritage and values, which appeared to be discredited at the expense of looking more Western and thinking more Western-like, even though the reality of family life and education for the largest portion of the population was in complete disagreement. In the words of the famous Iranian filmmaker Abbas Kiarostami, during the filming of Like Someone in Love: “To hell with American cinema, it’s made us all the same.”
The rise of anti-Americanism in Iran, often intertwined with the desire to reclaim national identity, culture, religion, customs, and state structures, reflects the perception of Americanism as a corrosive foreign influence. Combined with the abuses of the Pahlavi regime, it fueled a strong sentiment of self-preservation against an imperial power that seemed indifferent to the suffering of ordinary Iranians.
For the Shah, Americanism was both a vision of modernization and a cover for consolidating power and status in the Gulf; while its benefits were largely confined to high officials and the upper-middle class, the majority of the population bore a double burden: direct repression from the state and institutions like SAVAK, and indirect cultural censorship, as their own traditions, arts, and products were marginalized under the flood of imported American media and consumer goods.
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